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BALANCING BUSINESS INTERESTS WITH 
CONSUMER CONCERNS: A COMPARATIVE 
EXAMINATION OF U.S. AND E.U. COMMERCIAL 
EXPRESSION DOCTRINES 
SCOTT SIVLEY† 
ABSTRACT 
 
Warning: This Note does not deal with a particularly new nor particularly 
interesting subject. If sellers of goods and information were this forthcoming when 
making claims about their products, this Note would not be necessary. 
Unfortunately, there is a colossal tug of war, as illustrated by the Occupy Movement 
in the fall of 2011 and as campaign financing during the 2012 American election 
cycle has and will continue showing us, emerging in the domestic and global 
marketplace over who should ultimately be responsible for protecting consumers 
from irresponsible or false commercial speech. Should we continue down the road of 
survival of the fittest and leave it up to consumers to wade through the muck of 
puffery and illusion in an information age when new technologies and ideas pop up 
virtually overnight, or do governments and those who claim to look out for 
everyone’s best interest have a responsibility to do their job and regulate to provide 
for greater transparency? In fact, “consumers” is an erroneous description in this 
debate because it, in a sense, dehumanizes who consumers are, consumers are 
people with inalienable rights not some legal construct such as a corporation whose 
basic governing rules can wax and wane based on the whims of a state and a court.  
The legal profession has a role to play in this tug of war, but unfortunately more and 
more of those in the judiciary bring a clouded view of what the law should be and 
blindly discredit the idea that entities whose sole purpose is to make money will 
generally do whatever they can to make money.  The differences in the law of the 
United States and the European Union are admittedly subtle in this area, but the 
opinions and the authoritative articulations of the law have a profound, divergent 
effect on its consumers (a.k.a. citizens). The United States is a promise promulgated 
on its commitment to all of its peoples with business freedom serving its people not 
the other way around.  Our laws should reflect that promise. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
I wish [the Manicheans] might have heard what I said in comment on 
those words—without my knowing that they heard, lest they should think 
that I was speaking it just on their account. For, indeed, I should not have 
said quite the same things, nor quite in the same way. . . . And if I had so 
spoken, they would not have meant the same things to them as they did to 
me . . . .1 
Since St. Augustine‟s time, technology has evolved and people experience more 
during a lifetime, but core truths concerning the processes and susceptibilities of the 
human mind remain virtually unchanged.2 In later times, Rousseau and other 
enlightenment philosophers crafted arguments to free humanity from the bonds of 
                                                          
 1 ST. AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO, THE CONFESSIONS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE, Book Nine, Chapter 
IV, 8 (Albert C. Outler trans. and ed.), available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/ 
confessions-bod.html. 
 2 Because of internet, mobile phones and satellite television, humans simply have more 
information at their disposal.  Because of transportation shifting from horses to trains, cars and 
planes, people may go more places.  All of these basic facts of life allow the average human to 
have a far more robust life experience, but for example, most people have always feared death 
and the unknown, and both even in our technological age still drive many of our behaviors. 
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political and economic servitude. Freedom of expression was at the core of 
developing individual dignity, autonomy and self-realization.3   
Today, freedom of individual expression remains the cornerstone of democracy.4 
Pertinent to this paper, how far does that right extend in its pure form to commercial 
speakers? How one answers that question may depend on whether he or she views 
commercial speech as information transformed into a product that comes with 
responsibilities or simply as another legal category that serves the same purpose as 
other forms of protected speech?5   
The consumer society, to which we all belong, is predicated on business 
delivering messages that drive people to action.6  Businesses spend exorbitant 
amounts of money on effective psychological techniques to penetrate the media 
cloud of haze.7 
This Author takes the position that, if protected at all, commercial expression 
should remain subsidiary under freedom of expression doctrines of the United States 
and the European Union.  Moreover, U.S. courts should adopt a more expansive 
understanding of how advertising works and more carefully examine the intent and 
effect of language and images used in modern advertising. It will be shown by 
progressively reviewing Supreme Court holdings that today there are few (and 
becoming fewer) limits to commercial speech in America because the Court‟s 
opinions take the position that consumers have the right to more information which 
burdens them to increasingly becoming experts to make proper choices. However, 
the preferred model should encompass the European approach where the societal 
interest rests more in the accuracy of advertising claims and eliminating some of the 
clutter and ambiguity that advertised messages purposely create.    
Most important to this analysis involves an examination of differences between 
the two systems in how the “societal interest” is considered.  The case law will show 
that differences on this point lead to divergent outcomes between the systems.  I will 
analyze both systems‟ constitutional histories and frameworks and review relevant 
case law before espousing a preferred approach. 
                                                          
 3 See generally JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY 
(1755).  An inescapable premise of this paper is that the social contract is more important in a 
technological society of today than even the agrarian state in which it was conceived. 
Irresponsible expression destroys the balance between the powerful with access to media and 
the weak who have little resources to speak or the ability to band together.  Ultimately, a 
democracy is so skewed by such an imbalance because there is no equity in form or substance. 
 4 ROGER A. SHINER, FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION 3 (2003). 
 5 See generally id. at 3.  
 6 Advertising is de facto evidence of this practice. 
 7 IAIN RAMSAY, CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY: TEXT AND MATERIALS ON REGULATING 
CONSUMER MARKETS 395 (2007). 
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II.  CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS OF THE U.S. AND E.U. 
A.  The United States of America 
1.  The Supreme Court of the United States 
The United States of America is a constitutional federal republic with a 
constitution dating to 1789.8  Its constitution has an entrenched set of rights,9 and 
among other provisions sets forth the powers of the judiciary of the United States, 
including the establishment of the highest court, which is the United States Supreme 
Court (the Supreme Court), and other “inferior” courts established by Congress.10  
There are avenues of appeal to the highest court, but most importantly the Supreme 
Court, if it so chooses to exercise its power, is the final interpreter of constitutional 
questions.11  For comparative purposes, cases examined in this paper are limited to 
U.S. Supreme Court rulings.  
2.  The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
The controlling constitutional authority for freedom of expression is guaranteed 
in the Bill of Rights: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”12  The First Amendment now extends to state governments under the 
doctrine of incorporation.13  For most of its history, American jurisprudence 
understood the freedoms enjoyed to be either protecting individuals from the abuses 
of government or restraining the activities of government.14  One hundred fifty-three 
years passed from the Bill of Rights adoption without the Court examining whether 
business purposes merit any protection under the speech clause.15   
As differentiated from individual speech, commercial expression is now 
considered a low-level speech category,16 and is currently examined under the four 
prongs of the Central Hudson: Does the expression concern a lawful activity; and is 
it not misleading?  If both are answered “yes,” then one is to consider whether the 
“asserted governmental interest is substantial.”  Finally, if “yes,” a determination of 
whether the regulation is proportionate must be made.  Proportionality is determined 
                                                          
 8 The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last updated Nov. 17, 2011). 
 9 MARK TUSHNET, LIVING WITH A BILL OF RIGHTS, IN UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS 
(Connor Gearty & Adam Tomkins eds., 1995).  Entrenchment simply means that there are 
rights guaranteed to the people as part of the constitution.  In the U.S. those rights are the first 
ten amendments also known as the Bill of Rights. 
 10 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 11 Id. 
 12 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 13 Schneider v. New Jersey (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939). 
 14 See Steve Mount, Constitutional Topics: Bar to Federal Action, U.S. CONSTITUTION 
ONLINE, http://www.usconstitution.net/consttop_bor.html (last updated Jan. 24, 2010). 
 15 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 52 (1942). 
 16 Chaplisky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (acknowledging that First 
Amendment protection does not extend completely to all speech). 
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by examining whether the regulation directly advances the government‟s interest and 
is it narrowly tailored to serve that interest.17 
B.  The European Union 
The European Union (E.U.) is the current product of multilateral treaties agreed 
to by European States following World War II to avoid future clashes and promote 
prosperity while moving toward a more unified Europe.18  There is no actual 
constitutional apparatus for the E.U.; alternatively, a bolstered treaty framework 
remains intact.19  While this framework is more of a political agreement between 
states than a strict legal framework, the states‟ actions have shown intent to give up 
elements of sovereignty not typically granted in traditional treaties, and have 
certainly created a “specified legal order.”20  That order includes making individuals 
of the member states citizens of the E.U.21  Subsequently, they have rights that are 
interpreted on the Community level against member states.22  
The cooperative efforts took two paths in the early days.23  One path flowed from 
human rights concerns24 while the other centered on economic and political 
stability.25  Each path resulted in the following separate convention frameworks. 
                                                          
 17 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‟n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 
(1980). 
 18  Post World War II Europe, cooperative efforts first came in the steel industry among a 
few nations and with the purpose evolving toward establishing the internal market, and thus 
not particularly interested in dealing with fundamental rights of persons.  It was nearly twenty 
years later that The European Court of Justice “would protect fundamental rights as general 
principles of law.  See generally ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT 
OF JUSTICE 337 (2006). 
 19 What the EU Constitution Says, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
2950276.stm (last updated June 22, 2004) (“The constitution brings together for the first time 
the many treaties and agreements on which the EU is based.  It defines the powers of the EU, 
stating where it can act and where the member states retain their right of veto.”  After being 
signed in June 2004, French and Dutch voters rejected it and thus the effort failed.).  See 
generally The „Treaty of Lisbon,‟ EUROACTIV.COM, http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-
eu/treaty-lisbon/article-163412 (last visited Nov. 17, 2011) (The Treaty of Lisbon was created 
after the failed attempt at a constitution.  It contains many of the changes envisioned to have 
been part of the Constitutional Treaty but instead were formulated as amendments to the 
existing treaties.  After contentious efforts, most notably in Ireland, the Treaty of Lisbon came 
into force on Dec. 1, 2009.). 
 20 P S R F MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 39 (2007). They have done 
this by making the agreements limitless in duration, created agreed upon institutions for 
enforcement and the law binds not only the member states together but also residents of the 
member states. 
 21 Id. 
 22 See generally id. at 5 n. 8. 
 23 See Patricia R. Waagstein, Human Rights Protection in Europe: Between Strasbourg 
and Luxembourg, SPICE, http://spice.stanford.edu/docs/human_rights_protection_in_europe 
_between_strasbourg_and_luxembourg/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). 
 24 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights as amended by 
Protocols Nos. 11 and 14 (adopted Nov. 4, 1950 as amended June 1, 2010), C.E.T.S. No. 194, 
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1.  European Convention on Human Rights 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is enforceable against all 
forty-seven signatories.26  While controlling over the ECHR member states, it was 
initially and only observed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), acting on behalf 
of the E.U., out of respect for the “common constitutional traditions of the member 
states.”27  This interplay will be discussed further in the ECJ section. 
Commercial speech, as applied by both the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and ECJ, is part of freedom of expression but has been afforded less 
protection than other forms of individual expression, particularly political 
expression.28  The test employed by both courts is effectively stated by the ECtHR as 
follows: “[i]t should therefore be determined whether it was „prescribed by 
law,‟ whether it pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph 
and whether it was „necessary in a democratic society‟ to achieve such aims.”29  The 
ECJ adds gloss to this test.  It uses the word “justified” in its reasoning when 
examining the legal basis, which is similar to the “prescribed by law” language of 
the ECtHR.  It adds proportionality, which is similar to Central Hudson, but in effect 
it is simply a more thorough method of analyzing the “necessity” component the 
ECtHR utilizes. 
2.  The European Court of Human Rights 
Section II, Article 19 of the ECHR established the ECtHR.30  Its jurisdiction is 
laid out in Article 32, which states, “1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to 
all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the 
                                                          
213 U.N.T.S. 221, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF 1950, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/ENG 
ENG_CONV.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2011) [hereinafter ECHR].  The European Convention 
on Human Rights of 1950 established the original concept of the now European Court of 
Human Rights. 
 25 See Arnull, supra note 18, at 5.  Article 31 of the Treaty establishing the Economic Coal 
and Steel Community of 1951 established “a court of justice” to interpret and apply the treaty 
for the member states.  Now, the functions of the court of justice are: As part of that mission, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union: reviews the legality of the acts of the institutions 
of the European Union, ensures that the Member States comply with obligations under the 
Treaties, and interprets European Union law at the request of the national courts and tribunals.  
The Court thus constitutes the judicial authority of the European Union and, in cooperation 
with the courts and tribunals of the Member States, it ensures the uniform application and 
interpretation of European Union law.  See also EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE WEBSITE, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_6999/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2011) [hereinafter ECJ 
Website]. 
 26 Frequently Asked Questions, ECtHR, Oct. 2010 edition, at 5-6, http://www.echr.coe.int 
/NR/rdonlyres/5C53ADA4-80F8-42CB-B8BD-CBBB781F42C8/0/FAQ_ENG_A4.pdf ( la s t  
visited Nov. 17, 2011).  
 27 ECJ Website, supra note 25.  
 28 Church of Scientology v. Sweden, E.C.C. 511, 527 (1979). 
 29 Markt Intern GmbH & Beermann v. Germany, 12 E.H.R.R. 161, 172 (1990). 
 30 ECHR, supra note 24, Section II, art. 19. 
2012]   BALANCING BUSINESS INTERESTS WITH CONSUMER CONCERNS 235 
 
protocols thereto . . . . 2. In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has 
jurisdiction, the Court shall decide.”31  Besides binding judgments as set forth in 
Article 46, the ECtHR may also make advisory opinions through its Article 47 
powers.32  
The ECtHR reviews cases brought against states33 by individuals, groups of 
individuals, other contracting states,34 companies, and even NGOs.35  The decisions 
of the ECtHR are binding against states, and member states “are obliged” to put the 
decision into force.36  
3.  Article 10 of the ECHR 
Article 10 of the Convention provided the first shared articulation of freedom of 
expression among European states.37 Unlike the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, Article 10 of the ECHR includes provisions outlining the rights 
and the duties along with responsibilities those rights entails:  
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers.  This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the 
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.  
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, 
for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.38 
4.  The Treaty of Lisbon 
Following the failed attempt at a constitution, the latest and most comprehensive 
of the treaties of the European Union is the Treaty of Lisbon.39  Coming into force on 
                                                          
 31 Id. art. 32. 
 32 Id. art. 46-47. 
 33 Id. art. 34. 
 34 Id. art. 33. 
 35 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 26, at 7-8. 
 36 Id. at 10. 
 37  ECHR, supra note 24, Section I, art. 10 §§ 1-2 (this is more than the number of current 
members states in the E.U.). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Treaties and Law, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/index_en.htm (last visited 
Dec. 16, 2010). 
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December 1, 2009, it has consolidated and amended many of the agreements40 made 
since the first agreement on coal and steel in 195241 until today, with E.U. 
membership now including 27 states.42  It formally made the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights binding law in the E.U,43 and maintained the ECJ as the superior court for 
questions of E.U. law44 with jurisdiction to decide human rights cases.45  
The body that is now known as The Court of Justice for the European Union 
(ECJ) was first established in 1952 by the treaty establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community,46 and just as the E.U. has expanded so too has the ECJ‟s 
jurisdiction and mandate. 
Today, it interprets and applies E.U. legislation for uniform application in all 
member states.  It hears cases involving member states, EU institutions and EU 
citizens.47  Each member state has a seat on the Court, but usually hears cases as a 
panel of thirteen or five.  Additionally, the court is assisted by advocates-general 
who compile cases and present preliminary decisions on the matters that come 
before the panels and whose opinion is included in the public record.48  The Court, 
aside from adjudicating cases, may also provide preliminary rulings upon request of 
member states that act as advisory opinions.49  This supports the court‟s primary goal 
of bringing consistency to the laws of the E.U.50 
As mentioned, the ECJ looks to the traditions of the member states, which allows 
it to give weight and validity to the ECHR.  This is legally referred to as “accession,” 
and as related to fundamental rights, was first recognized in an ECJ decision of 
1986.51  With amendments made by the Treaty of Lisbon, the ECJ now must accede 
                                                          
 40 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007/C306/01, available at EUROPA.EU, 
http://europa.ed/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2010) [hereinafter 
Treaty of Lisbon]. 
 41 MATHIJSEN, supra note 20, at 13. 
 42 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 40, ¶ 2. 
 43 Id. ¶ 3. 
 44 Institutions, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/institutions/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 
2010) [hereinafter Institutions]. 
 45 See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 40. 
 46 Institutions, supra note 44. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. See also ECJ Website, supra note 25 (explaining the public hearing and advocate 
general‟s role). 
 49 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 40. 
 50 ECJ Website, supra note 25 (court within the legal order of the E.U.). 
 51 See id.  “After numerous terrorist attacks against the police, police officers in Northern 
Ireland began carrying fire-arms.  However, on the grounds of public safety, women police 
officers were not authorised to carry fire-arms (on the basis of a certificate issued by the 
competent minister which could not be challenged before the courts).  As a result, full-time 
contracts in the Northern Ireland police were no longer offered to women.  On a reference 
from a United Kingdom court, the Court held that excluding any power of review by the 
courts of a certificate issued by a national authority runs counter to the principle of effective 
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to the ECHR when applying “general principles of the Union‟s law,” however; this 
accession does not affect the competences of the Union or the powers of its 
institutions.52   
The Court of Justice‟s incorporation of the principles of the ECHR into Union 
law made it possible to maintain the independence of the ECtHR and ECJ while 
creating coherence in their work.53  More to the point, commercial expression is a 
concept that encompasses both economic behavior and human rights, so it is an area 
of the law that is perfectly suited for the ECJ to weighs-in on since it does so 
primarily acknowledging the fact that there is a human rights component to all 
economic decisions54 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights came into effect in 2000,55 but only with the 
adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon is it now legally binding.56  Article 11 is far less 
comprehensive than its companion, Article 10 of the ECHR, and as such, is not cited 
as often in case law or any comparative cases used in this paper.  Article 11 states, 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference 
by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”57   
 As explained, the ECJ and the ECtHR are autonomous and distinct, however 
both cooperate and, as will be seen, use the same basis for deciding cases.  
Therefore, a sampling of cases from both courts will be analyzed to provide a view 
as to the approach the E.U. has taken on commercial speech. 
                                                          
judicial control which may be relied upon by all persons who consider themselves wronged by 
discrimination on grounds of sex (Johnston, 1986).” 
 52 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 40 at Protocol 8 concerning Article 6 (1) and (2). 
 53 See generally ARNULL, supra note 18, at 368. 
 54 See Waagstein, supra note 23. 
 55 The Charter of Fundamental Rights, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/ 
charter_fundamental_rights_en.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2010) (“The EU's Charter of 
Fundamental Rights was solemnly proclaimed by the Nice European Council on 7 December 
2000. It is based on the Community Treaties, international conventions such as the 1950 
European Convention on Human Rights and the 1989 European Social Charter, constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States and various European Parliament declarations. . . . 
the Charter defines fundamental rights relating to dignity, liberty, equality, solidarity, 
citizenship and justice.  While the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is limited 
to protecting civil and political rights, the Charter goes further to cover workers' social rights, 
data protection, bioethics and the right to good administration.”). 
 56 See Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 40. 
 57 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 11, Dec. 18, 2000, 
2000/C364/01, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 16. 2010). 
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III.  DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN THE U.S. AND E.U. 
A.  American Commercial Expression 
1.  Before Central Hudson 
In 1942, The United States Supreme Court weighed in on what (if any) level of 
protection should be enjoyed by commercial actors in Valentine v. Chrestensen.58  
The case involved a New York City sanitation code making it illegal for any person 
to “throw, cast or distribute . . . commercial or business advertising matter” on the 
public streets, public areas or private property.59  The majority firmly expressed its 
longstanding commitment to freedom of expression in the public arena, particularly 
noting streets.60  The Court went on to just as firmly state, “the Constitution imposes 
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”61   
Relying on advice from the police commissioner that handbills with information 
of a public use or protest62 was acceptable, Chrestensen published a handbill that on 
one side promoted his business while the other side protested §318 of the code.63  
The court noted Valentine‟s efforts to circumvent the intent of the law by stating, “If 
[merchants‟] evasion were successful, every merchant who desires to broadcast 
advertising leaflets in the streets need only append a civic appeal, or a moral 
platitude, to achieve immunity from the law's command.”64  Even while holding that 
commercial speech was not protected under the First Amendment,65 the case was the 
harbinger of an oncoming commercial speech debate. 
The next major step in carving out the protection for commercial expression 
came in 1975 with Bigelow v. Virginia.66  In that case, the Supreme Court reviewed a 
Virginia statute that made the circulation of any publication that advertised support 
of abortion in any manner illegal.67  Bigelow, the editor of a Virginia-based 
newspaper, had allowed an advertisement to be printed that let readers know 
abortions were legal in New York State and provided information for a referral 
service.  Bigelow was convicted under the Virginia law and subsequently appealed 
to the Supreme Court.68  The Supreme Court reversed his conviction.69 
                                                          
 58 Valentine, 316 U.S. at 52. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 53. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 52. 
 63 Valentine, 316 U.S. at 53-54. 
 64 Id. at 53-54. 
 65 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 758 (1976) (citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942)). 
 66 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See id.  See also Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 759-60. 
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While not explicitly carving out protection for commercial speech, the Court 
stated Chrestensen was limited in validity, and commercial speech was not 
valueless.70  
Following Bigelow just one year later in 1976, the transition to protecting 
commercial speech was completed with Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council.71 In this case, the Supreme Court finally considered 
whether a First Amendment exception to commercial speech existed.72  The 
plaintiffs, a consumer group known as Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, sued, 
challenging § 54-524.35 of the Virginia Code Annotated.73  The code regulated the 
professional conduct of pharmacists and specifically limited the ability of 
pharmacists to advertise or promote the prices or terms of a transaction for the sale 
of drugs requiring a prescription.74  The relevant text of the statute is §§ 2 and 3 of § 
54-524.35, which stated: 
Any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who 
. . . (2) issues, publishes, broadcasts by radio, or otherwise, or distributes 
or uses in any way whatsoever advertising matter in which statements are 
made about his professional service which have a tendency to deceive or 
defraud the public, contrary to the public health and welfare; or (3) 
publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner 
whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit 
terms for professional services or for drugs containing narcotics or for any 
drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription.75 
The consumer group, as appellees, argued that First Amendment protection flows 
not only to advertisers but also to the recipients of the information.76  The Court 
agreed with this proposition by stating, “[f]reedom of speech presupposes a willing 
speaker.  But where a speaker exists . . . the protection afforded is to the 
communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”77    
The Board of Pharmacy took the position that commercial speech was not 
afforded any protection under the First Amendment.78  The Court pointed out that, 
                                                          
 70 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 819. 
 71 Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 761-62. 
 72 Id. at 760-61. 
 73 Id. at 749. 
 74 Id. at 750. 
 75 Id.  
 76 Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 748, 756-57. 
 77 Id. at 757 (citing Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), in which the 
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 78 Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 758. 
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since 1951, no protection had been denied simply because the speech was 
commercial.79 
The Court differentiated this case from Chrestensen, Bigelow, and other cases by 
stating:  
Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any subject, cultural, 
philosophical, or political.  He does not wish to report any particularly 
newsworthy fact, or to make generalized observations even about 
commercial matters.  The “idea” he wishes to communicate is simply this: 
“I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price.”  Our question, 
then, is whether this communication is wholly outside the protection of 
the First Amendment.80 
The Court decided the prevailing societal interest was the free flow of information 
instead of the public harm that could come with less regulation at the point of sale in 
the pharmaceutical industry,81 and stated, “Advertising, however tasteless and 
excessive . . . is nonetheless dissemination of information . . . .  It is a matter of 
public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well 
informed.  To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.82 
 The Court held that commercial speech was afforded protection under the First 
Amendment, but there were instances where it could be regulated.83  Soon, this 
approach was ingrained by the Supreme Court when it established the Central 
Hudson test for commercial expression.84   
2.  Central Hudson  
The Supreme Court set forth the modern test for American commercial 
expression in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of 
New York.85  The question presented in this case was whether a regulation of the 
Public Service Commission of the State of New York violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments because it completely banned promotional advertising by 
an electrical utility.86 
Following the energy crisis of the 1970s, the Public Service Commission of New 
York (hereinafter PSC) sought a continued ban on advertising materials.  It divided 
advertisements “into two broad categories: promotional-advertising intended to 
stimulate the purchase of utility services-and institutional and informational, a broad 
category inclusive of all advertising not clearly intended to promote sales.”87  It 
                                                          
 79 Id. at 759. 
 80 Id. at 761. 
 81 Id. at 765. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 770. 
 84 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 558. 
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proceeded to declare all promotional advertising to be contrary to public policy and 
banned it, but allowed informational advertising to continue.88  Its reasoning was to 
encourage advertising that shifted consumption practices of the public toward more 
energy efficient means.89 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. (hereinafter Central Hudson) lost at each 
level prior to the Supreme Court, because consumers actually had no choice when it 
came to deciding who would provide electrical power.90  Central Hudson was 
challenging the restraint of commercial speech under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.91 
The Court first noted the limitation on states to regulate First Amendment rights 
because of the Fourteenth Amendment.92  Then the Supreme Court affirmed the 
Virginia Bd. proposition of the societal interest in commercial speech by stating, 
“[c]ommercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but 
also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest 
possible dissemination of information.”93  Before explaining the test, the Court 
reaffirmed its position that “[t]he Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to 
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.  The 
protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of 
the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.”94 
The Court then established the current four-part test:  
[1.] If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful 
activity, the government's power is more circumscribed.  
[2.] The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by 
restrictions on commercial speech.  
 
[If both of these prongs are satisfied, the Court then goes to the next level 
of analysis.]  Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in proportion to 
that interest.  The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to 
achieve the State's goal.  Compliance with this requirement may be 
measured by [the following] two criteria.  
 
[3.] The restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the 
regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote 
support for the government's purpose.  
                                                          
 88 See id. at 559-60. 
 89 Id. at 560. 
 90 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561. 
 91 Id. at 560. 
 92 Id. at 561. 
 93 Id. at 561-62. 
 94 Id. at 562-63. 
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[4.] If the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited 
restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot 
survive.95 
In this case, the question really involved the second prong of the test.96  Applying 
the test, the Court held that while the governmental interest in controlling and 
adapting energy usage was substantial and the regulation did directly advance the 
government‟s interest, the regulation was not narrowly tailored to serve the interest 
of the state and therefore it was found to be unconstitutional.97  
3.  After Central Hudson 
Interestingly, the Central Hudson test is best considered in the context of cases 
dealing with the highly regulated products of alcohol, tobacco and pharmaceuticals 
that follow.    
In 1995, the Supreme Court examined the appropriateness of alcohol content 
appearing on the labels of beer products.98  Coors Brewing Company (hereinafter 
Coors) was challenging § 205(e)(2) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act that 
prohibited beer labels from displaying alcohol content.99   
The government argued for a deferential approach instead of applying Central 
Hudson in this case, because there was a history of more leeway being granted when 
the regulation concerned socially harmful activities.100  The Court disregarded this 
line of argument and moved on to the government‟s attempt to meet its burden by 
asserting two interests it felt were sufficiently “substantial” to justify the labeling 
ban.   
First, the Government contends that § 205(e)(2) advances Congress' goal 
of curbing “strength wars” by beer brewers who might seek to compete 
for customers on the basis of alcohol content. According to the 
Government, the FAAA's restriction prevents a particular type of beer 
drinker-one who selects a beverage because of its high potency-from 
choosing beers solely for their alcohol content. In the Government's view, 
restricting disclosure of information regarding a particular product 
characteristic will decrease the extent to which consumers will select the 
product on the basis of that characteristic.101  
Additionally, the government argued that its efforts aided those of states that 
wished to regulate alcohol under the Twenty-first Amendment, and would prevent 
consumers from crossing state lines to thwart certain states‟ laws on the matter.102  
                                                          
 95 Id. at 564. 
 96 See generally id.  
 97 See id.  
 98 See generally Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
 99 Id. at 478. 
 100 Id. at 482.  
 101 Id. at 483-84. 
 102 Id. at 485-86. 
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Coors reframed the government‟s intention as one which was designed to control 
competition on the basis of strength of beer.103  It noted the trend toward more 
information not less for consumers.104  The Court rejected the so-called “strength 
war” argument because, while it may be substantial, it did not directly advance the 
governmental interest.105 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court first rejected the government‟s claim of assisting 
the states under part two of the test, declaring that the stated interest was not 
substantial enough to meet the requirements.106  
Only a year later in 1996, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island required the 
Supreme Court to review a Rhode Island statutory ban on advertising alcoholic 
beverage prices in places other than the store.107  In this case, the Court further 
expanded its deference to commercial speech under the First Amendment, and in so 
doing, watered down the Central Hudson test by stating, “[W]hen a State entirely 
prohibits the dissemination of truthful, non-misleading commercial messages for 
reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less 
reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally 
demands.”108 
The case centered on two separate 1956 statutory prohibitions of the Rhode 
Island    codes.109  The first applied to vendors‟ efforts to advertise prices except on 
the product or signs near the product in the store.110  The other ban prohibited the 
media from broadcasting advertisements for the sale of alcoholic beverages.111  44 
Liquormart had placed a newspaper ad in 1991 leading to this case.112 
Rhode Island took the position that the prohibitions promoted reduced 
drinking.113  Therefore, the Court had to determine whether the ban 
would significantly reduce alcohol consumption.114  The Court found no evidence 
that there would be a significant reduction in consumption.115 
The Court grounded its decision by stating, “As a result, neither the „greater 
objectivity‟ nor the „greater hardiness‟ of truthful, non-misleading commercial 
speech justifies reviewing its complete suppression with added deference.”116  
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Summing up its reasoning for striking down the Rhode Island legislation, the court 
reiterated Virginia Board of Pharmacy by favoring a country where information is 
“misused” over a country where information is suppressed.117 
In Thompson v. Western States a group of licensed pharmacists who specialized 
in compounding drugs sought to invalidate § 127(a) of the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act of 1997.118  The Act exempted “compounded 
drugs” from the FDA‟s standard drug approval requirements so long as the providers 
refrained from advertising or promoting particular compounded drugs among other 
restrictions.  Their position was that this was an infringement of their First 
Amendment rights.119 
The government conceded that the providers were making truthful statements 
that were not misleading, but grounded its argument in three substantial interests.  
Those interests were:  preserving the new drug approval process‟s effectiveness, 
ensuring those patients who needed the compounded drugs had access, and creating 
the proper balance between two compelling opposed views.120 
Writing for the majority, Justice O‟Connor suggested a number of non-speech 
methods for accomplishing the goals of the government.121  She then noted that the 
government gave no evidence that her options would be unworkable, which is 
important since it is up to the party wishing to limit speech to carry the burden under 
Central Hudson.122  
The majority ruled that § 127a was unconstitutional.123  The government had 
failed to justify any of its reasons, and the Court seemingly was concerned with the 
overbreadth of the statutory construction, as it would impinge, for instance, upon 
pharmacists who served special clienteles.124   
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Supreme Court had to determine whether 
certain tobacco product advertising regulations were pre-empted by the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), and whether certain 
Massachusetts regulations on the advertisement and sale of tobacco products 
violated the First Amendment.125  For purposes of this paper, only the second 
question will be examined. 
The regulations in question were 940 Code of Mass. Regs. §§ 
21.04(5)(a), 22.06(5)(a) (2000) which prohibited advertising of smokeless tobacco or 
cigars within a 1,000 foot radius of a school or playground126 and 940 Code of Mass. 
                                                          
 117 See generally id. 
 118 Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 368. 
 121 Id. at 372. 
 122 Id. at 373 (quoting Bolger v. Young‟s Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (1983). 
 123 Thompson, 353 U.S. at 377. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, at 556 (2001) (quoting Board of Trustees 
of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 3038 (1989)). 
 126 Id. at 556. 
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Regs. §§ 21.04(5)(b), 22.06(5)(b) (2000) which restricted advertising to no “lower 
than five feet from the floor of any retail establishment which is located within a one 
thousand foot radius of any school or playground.”127  
The parties stipulated that the advertisements concerned lawful activity and were 
not misleading.128  Furthermore, no contention was made that the government did not 
have a substantial interest in preventing tobacco use among minors.129  Justice 
O‟Connor then explained that the Central Hudson test‟s third prong demands 
scrutiny of the relationship between the harm caused and how the methods the State 
uses to advance its interests directly and materially meet its objective.130  
Justice O‟Connor then expressed the standard for justifying restrictions included 
academic studies and examples of similar situations from different areas, but 
empirical data was not necessary.131 
The Massachusetts Attorney General cited a Surgeon General report that 
provided significant statistical analysis supporting the proposition that advertising 
and labeling played a significant role in a youth‟s decision to use cigarettes and 
smokeless tobacco.132  The majority accepted this and additional evidence to find 
that the regulations did advance the governmental interest.133 
Moving to the last prong of narrow tailoring, Justice O‟Connor confirmed that 
“the least restrictive means” is not the standard; instead, the case law requires a 
reasonable fit between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish 
those ends . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.”134  
At the final stage of inquiry, the 1,000-foot outdoor regulation failed Central 
Hudson.135  The petitioners‟ argument that the geographical reach of the regulations 
would significantly diminish, the access adults had to cigarette and smokeless 
tobacco advertising, the point nearing a complete ban.136  “Petitioners maintained 
that this . . . would prevent advertising in 87% to 91% of Boston, Worcester, and 
Springfield, Massachusetts. . . . Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that the 
regulations prohibit advertising in a substantial portion of the major metropolitan 
areas of Massachusetts.137   
The ban also included advertising in the store if visible from outside the store 
while also restricting the size of the ads plus any oral statements.138  Ultimately, 
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these facts show the Attorney General did not adequately consider the broad 
geographical sweep of the regulation, and thus that it was not narrowly tailored nor 
were the speech interests properly calculated.139  
940 Code of Mass. Regs. §§ 21.04(5)(b), 22.06(5)(b) (2000), requiring 
advertisements be a minimum height of five feet off the floor, failed both the third 
and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test in the majority‟s opinion.140  The Court 
highlighted the third prong and pointed out that not all children are shorter than five 
feet tall, and even if not that tall, almost all have the ability to look up the relatively 
short distance to see the advertisement.141  Therefore, the regulation did not advance 
the government‟s substantial interest.142  
B.  European Commercial Expression 
As previously mentioned in part II of this paper, commercial expression is 
protected under Article 10 of the ECHR.143  The ECtHR has granted much more 
deference to regulations restricting commercial speech than in its consideration of 
restrictions on other forms of expression.144  The ECtHR has paid particular attention 
to the phrase “necessary in a democratic society,” and interpreted it to imply a 
pressing social need is at stake.145  To interpret this requirement, the ECtHR has 
taken a similar approach to the U.S Supreme Court by distinguishing types of 
expression and then applying an appropriate level of scrutiny.146  Given the 
peculiarities of the E.U., the ECtHR has given member states a bit of discretion in 
determining whether a “pressing social need” exists in its state.147 
While the ECtHR has more expansively applied its commercial expression 
doctrine to a wider array of commercial speech than just conventional advertising,148 
the U.S has remained focused solely on advertising, and thus for comparative 
purposes, only advertising cases will be examined in this section.   
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 143 Casado Coca v. Spain, 18 E.H.R.R (1984) (“In its Barthold v. Germany judgment of 25 
March 1985 the Court left open the question whether commercial advertising as such came 
within the scope of the guarantees under Article 10, but its later case law provides guidance on 
this matter.  Article 10 does not apply solely to certain types of information or ideas or forms 
of expression, in particular those of a political nature; it also encompasses artistic expression, 
information of a commercial nature—as the Commission rightly pointed out—and even light 
music and commercials transmitted by cable.”). 
 144 Id. 
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The first case the ECtHR examined in the area of commercial speech149 came in 
1979.150  At issue in Church of Scientology v. Sweden was a Swedish court‟s 
injunction of the use of the phrase “an invaluable aid to measuring man's mental 
state and changes in it”151 in an advertisement that appeared in a Scientology 
magazine promoting the Hubbard Electrometer.  The Scientologists advertised the 
“E-Meter” as a “religious artifact used to measure the state of electrical 
characteristics of the „static field‟ surrounding the body.”152  In this case, the ECtHR 
rejected any freedom of religion claims the Scientologists might have had.153   
The Court announced that commercial speech is part of freedom of expression 
but it is not afforded the same rights as political expression.154  In its decision, the 
Court differentiated between Scientology‟s right to have religious opinions on the E-
Meter and using those opinions to profit from the sale of the E-Meter under Article 
10.155  
The Court used the text of Article 10(2) to develop a three-pronged test: 1. the 
restriction imposed must be prescribed by law; 2. whether there is a legitimate aim of 
the restriction; and 3. is the restriction necessary?156 
In this case, the controlling law was the 1970 Marketing (Improper Practices) Act 
which prohibited unfair marketing practices, including unfair advertising methods.157  
Therefore, prong one was met.  The Court found the legitimate aim of the State was 
that of protecting consumers from misleading and deceptive practices, which it noted 
was consistently found in the States‟ own legislation, thus satisfying prong two.158  
Finally, the Court held that the restriction was necessary given the facts of the case 
and the goals of the Convention.159 The Court also created a standard of review in 
which it stated “the test of „necessity‟ in the second paragraph of Article 10 should 
therefore be a less strict one when applied to restraints imposed on commercial 
„ideas.‟”160 Accordingly, the Court upheld the injunction on the phrase used in the 
advertisement.161 
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Another case that mixed concepts usually tied to free expression was the case of 
Markt Intern & Beermann v Germany.162  Instead of religion this case brought in 
elements of freedom of the press.163   The case involved Markt Intern, a trade 
magazine publisher that reprinted a letter written by Mr. Klaus Beermann to a British 
mail order company stating his dissatisfaction with the product.164  Markt Intern was 
attempting to gain a response from the company on behalf of Mr. Beermann.165  The 
mail order company did respond and the response was published.166  Markt Intern‟s 
subsequent column went further by requesting submissions from readers related to 
the products and customer service of the mail order company.167   
German courts granted an interim injunction based on the idea that Markt Intern 
had breached § 1 of the Unfair Competition Act 1909.168  After fifteen years of the 
case working its way through the German courts and a negative result in the 
European Commission, Germany submitted the question of whether it had violated 
article 10 of the ECHR to the ECtHR.169 
In its analysis, the ECtHR reiterated the test for examining an Article 10 case that 
it had employed in Scientology170 by stating, “[i]t should therefore be determined 
whether it was „prescribed by law,‟ whether it pursued one or more of the legitimate 
aims set out in that paragraph and whether it was „necessary in a democratic 
society‟ to achieve such aims.”171 
The ECtHR upheld the injunction as applied to the test.172  Prong one of the test 
was met because Germany had based its injunction on the 1909 Unfair Competition 
Act mentioned earlier.  When making a determination relating to prong two, the 
Court considered there was a legitimate aim on the part of Germany to protect the 
rights of others.173  While there were lesser disputes over the first two prongs‟ 
applicability in the case, the main question came down to whether the action taken 
was necessary in a democratic society.174  The Court rooted its decision in the 
                                                          
idea that the machine was incapable of determining one‟s mental state given the generally 
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 169 Id. at 170. 
 170 See generally Church of Scientology v. Sweden, E.C.C. 511 (1979). 
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“margin of appreciation” granted to member states to enact and enforce regulations 
that are particular to the circumstances of its own people and systems of governance 
and commerce.175  Notwithstanding the “margin of appreciation,” the court also 
examined its necessity by weighing the proportionality of the regulatory effect to aid 
the rights of others with the right to publish the information.176  
The court recognized that truthful disclosures are of interest to readers and 
promote open business dealings, but even true information describing real events 
may sometimes be prohibited to uphold the privacy of others or maintain the 
confidentiality of some information.177  The ECtHR found the German court had 
reached a reasonable decision that did not exceed the “margin of appreciation” 
granted to national courts.178 
In 2004, the ECJ reviewed an Austrian court decision to issue an injunction that 
restricted the use of the phrase “insolvency auction” in an advertisement for goods, 
which were no longer being sold during an insolvency estate sale.179  In Herbert 
Karner Industrie GmbH v. Troostwijk GmbH, the ECJ applied reasoning that looks 
very similar to Central Hudson, and reiterated many of the same propositions that the 
ECtHR articulated.180  
In reviewing the Austrian regulation, the ECJ examined Articles 28 and 30 EC 
and applied Council Directive 84/450/EEC as amended by 97/55/EC, which 
concerns misleading and comparative advertising in business-to-consumer and 
business-to-business transactions.181  The purpose of that directive was “to protect 
consumers . . . against misleading advertising . . . .”182  The directive defined 
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misleading advertising as “any advertising which in any way, including its 
presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive . . . by reason of deceptive nature, [and] 
is likely to affect their economic behavior. . . .”183   
To determine whether the advertisement was misleading, the Court looked to the 
characteristics of goods and services advertised, their availability, origination, and 
even tests of products, among other considerations.184  Prior to his preliminary 
analysis on behalf of the court, the advocate general stated the goal: “[i]n the Court‟s 
case law, consumer protection and fair trading are considered to be overriding 
requirements in the general interest which are in principle capable of justifying 
restrictions” on advertising and movement of goods.185  
The advocate general reminded the Court of its responsibility to uphold the 
ECHR when within the scope of Community law, and additionally stated that 
commercial expression is part of Article 10(1) of the ECHR, and advertising 
specifically is part of commercial expression.186  When making its judgment, the 
Court accepted the advocate general‟s finding that the regulation was a restriction on 
freedom of expression and restricted truthful information.187   
The advocate general articulated the test that the ECJ applied in its judgment.188  
The threshold inquiry for the court to examine is whether the restriction is 
justified.189  The Court then summarized the test:  
[T]he discretion enjoyed by the national authorities in determining the 
balance to be struck between freedom of expression and the 
abovementioned objectives varies for each of the goals justifying 
restrictions on that freedom and depends on the nature of the activities in 
question.  When the exercise of the freedom does not contribute to a 
discussion of public interest and, in addition, arises in a context in which 
the Member States have a certain amount of discretion, review is limited 
to an examination of the reasonableness and proportionality of the 
interference.  This holds true for the commercial use of freedom of 
expression, particularly in a field as complex and fluctuating as 
advertising.190 
When examining whether a regulation is justified, the Court first looked to 
Article 10(2) that expressly states that “freedom of expression may be restricted in so 
far as such restriction is necessary and provided for by law.”191  Comparison to 
ECtHR cases, in particular Markt Intern and Casado Coca, was made to show that 
advertisements being restricted to protect others‟ rights and reputations is consistent 
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with the ECtHR view that commercial expression may be restricted more extensively 
than political expression because “commercial expression does not normally perform 
a wider social function of any significance.”192 
Upon passing this threshold, the next consideration was whether the prohibition 
on advertising is necessary.193  Truth is an element considered in gauging necessity, 
but the context of the truth is as vital.194  Subsequently, when the seller wanted to call 
his auction an “Insolvency Auction” although the items came from another 
insolvency estate sale, it was necessary to regulate such behavior to protect the 
interests of the consumers and other competitors as well.195  The ECJ held that, given 
the facts and the deference Member States are given, the restriction on the 
advertising was reasonable and proportionate to achieve consumer protection and 
fair trading.196 
IV.  WHICH APPROACH IS BETTER FOR THE U.S. AND E.U. IN THE 21
ST
 CENTURY? 
It is clear from the case law of both systems that today commercial expression 
holds a subsidiary place under freedom of expression of the individual.  However, if 
one created an accurate commercial speech continuum, the American case law 
would be much closer to making commercial expression fully protected than its 
European peers.  More alarming to those who support the subsidiary approach is that 
the United States may be trending toward placing commercial expression on an 
equal level to political speech.197     
From cases examined, there are areas of divergence between the two systems.  
These areas include who is best suited to analyze truth or what is not misleading; 
what level of deference will the courts give the representative bodies of the people; 
and what value is there in commercial speech.198 
A.  Who Decides What is Misleading? 
The Karner case is a good example of the difference between truth and accuracy.  
The items had come from an insolvency estate at some point, but the sale in question 
was not an actual direct insolvency sale.199  As such, the ad was not accurate, and so 
the court upheld regulations to prevent the sale being advertised as such.200  
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This contrasts with the Supreme Court‟s majority opinion in Virginia Bd. where 
the balance of power in the commercial speech debate shifted to corporate interests 
with one line: “people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well 
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of 
communication rather than to close them.”201  
How can one be well enough informed when the individual spends far less time 
and resources to understand the messages being fired at him or her daily?  If the item 
in question is coming from a street vendor selling Tiffany jewelry, buyer beware 
would probably and should suffice.  But what if it is a compound drug being sold by 
a pharmacist without the normal regulation of the FDA, as in Thompson.202  
Thompson is the best example of the American system being too attached to the 
ideal as opposed to the reality that the public simply does not always have the time, 
resources and, unfortunately, the mindset to combat advertisements that purposely 
distort a human sense of reality.203 
B.  The Courts vs. Legislatures 
There are areas of the law that lend themselves to greater appreciation for the 
findings of the duly elected representatives of the people.  Commercial expression 
should be one such area.   
Justice O‟Connor, writing for the majority in Lorillard, stated that justifications 
for restrictions need not be strictly empirical data.  She accepted academic studies 
and examples of similar situations from different areas; but when reviewing the 
deference the U.S. Supreme Court has given congressional and regulatory agencies‟ 
findings, this seems to be an imperfect science that has been too strictly applied by 
the Supreme Court in an effort to open the door wider for commercial expression. 
Justice Breyer, in his dissent in Thompson, weighed in on the risk of dismissing 
congressional findings too readily in order to apply the commercial speech doctrine 
by stating,  
[T]he Constitution demands a more lenient application . . . which, in 
particular, clearly distinguishes between “commercial speech” and other 
forms of speech demanding stricter constitutional protection.  Otherwise, 
an overly rigid “commercial speech” doctrine will transform what ought 
to be a legislative or regulatory decision about the best way to protect the 
health and safety of the American public into a constitutional decision 
prohibiting the legislature from enacting necessary protections. As history 
in respect to the Due Process Clause shows, any such transformation 
would involve a tragic constitutional misunderstanding.204 
The contrast is easily made when compared against the Markt Intern case.  There 
the ECtHR reiterated the approach that member states should have a “margin of 
appreciation” to decide what is best for their particular society‟s interests.205  
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Moreover, however, the legal question of what governmental body is better suited to 
make such decisions must be considered is a running theme through the cases 
examined in this paper.206  Should it be a court of very thoughtful people who are 
unaccountable and as such may uphold ideals without regard to the practical 
implications,207 or would the Courts be better served by giving greater deference to 
the regulatory agencies, legislative findings and laws, and experts, such as in the 
Scientology case?208 
While answering this question, Justice Breyer‟s dissent brings focus to the most 
pressing question: what is necessary for democracy to thrive?209  The European 
judicial decisions in this area, stemming from the express mandate of Article 10 of 
the ECHR, illustrate a greater appreciation for these “goals of society” as opposed to 
a blind adherence to a debatable principle of commercial expression.210  None of the 
judges or laws cited in this paper state any deviation from the idea that freedom of 
personal expression particularly in the area of political speech is crucial to the 
development and furtherance of democratic societies.  Nor do any propose that 
commercial expression should be on an equal standing.  However, those who 
willfully conflate core democratic values with marketplace desires do so at the risk 
of losing the very freedom western culture expounds.   
C.  What Value is Really Being Protected? 
Many of the best warnings of the potential problems with putting commercial 
expression on par with human expression come not from a bleeding-heart liberal but 
are encapsulated by then-Justice William H. Rehnquist, a highly respected 
conservative.  Dissenting in Central Hudson, he wrote, 
The line between “commercial speech,” and the kind of speech that those 
who drafted the First Amendment had in mind, may not be a technically 
or intellectually easy one to draw, but it surely produced far fewer 
problems than has the development of judicial doctrine in this area since 
Virginia Board.  For in the world of political advocacy 
and its marketplace of ideas, there is no such thing as a “fraudulent” idea: 
there may be useless proposals, totally unworkable schemes, as well as 
very sound proposals that will receive the imprimatur of the “marketplace 
of ideas” through our majoritarian system of election and representative 
government.  The free flow of information is important in this context not 
because it will lead to the discovery of any objective “truth,” but because 
it is essential to our system of self-government.211  
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Some Supreme Court justices argue that too much regulation or judicial 
adherence to strict standards of truth and accuracy are paternalistic.212  Others take 
the view that advertising undermines consumer sovereignty by creating a 
dependence effect which fuels the consumers‟ desires, not out of self-choice, but 
because advertising techniques are designed to create desires in an unsuspecting 
public.213  This is critical because how one sees the purposes and needs of speakers 
and recipients of commercial speech will determine how he or she will decide a case 
on the question of commercial expression.  If the American jurisprudence is to 
evolve toward the European approach, stricter standards on commercial expression 
need to be applied; otherwise the American consumer and ultimately the American 
democracy will suffer.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Therefore, the United States Supreme Court should reexamine its commercial 
expression doctrine under Central Hudson by re-evaluating what is actually at stake 
and in the best interests of the American democratic society.  To do this it must 
apply a common sense 21
st
 century understanding of the role and effect of 
advertising, and place people‟s interests ahead of business interests.  
However, the issue of commercial expression may simply be one that is a blind 
spot for the legal profession and politicians on both sides in America because 
increasingly they rely on the same tricks of the trade as the advertisers and marketers 
to gain victories for their side.  In conclusion, this paper ends where it began with a 
not-so-subtle warning against these trappings:  
During those years I taught the art of rhetoric.  Conquered by the desire 
for gain, I offered for sale speaking skills with which to conquer others. . . 
. I really preferred to have honest scholars . . . and, without tricks of 
speech, I taught these scholars the tricks of speech—not to be used against 
the life of the innocent, but sometimes to save the life of a guilty man.  
And thou, O God, didst see me from afar, stumbling on that slippery path 
and sending out some flashes of fidelity amid much smoke—guiding 
those who loved vanity and sought after lying, being myself their 
companion.214 
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